This paper describes a principal-agent relationship with a supervisor who has information about the agent. The agent and the supervisor have the possibility to collude and misinform the principal. From the literature we know t hat there exists an optimal contract which excludes collusion in equilibrium. The optimal contract, however, is ex post inecient and creates scope for renegotiation. If renegotiation is allowed then under some parameter constellations the optimal contract is a contract which necessarily induces collusion. The paper thus shows that the principal's behavior toward ex post ineciencies may determine whether collusion occurs in equilibrium.
Introduction
In recent y e ars economists have extended the standard hierarchical principal-agent m odel by including a third player: the supervisor. The extension can be used to analyze situations in which the principal is a b l e t o a c quire information about the agent from other economic agents. The problem which a r i ses in these situations is t h e m anipulation of information. Since the principal may use the supervisor's information to discipline the agent, the agent has an incentive t o c ollude with the supervisor and manipulate the information which i s s e n t to the principal. An i m portant question is then whether in equilibrium the principal will oer c ontracts which e xclude such forms of collusion. This paper shows that the answer t o t h i s question may d e pend on the principal's b e havior toward contracts which turn out to be inecient e x post. If she is e xpected to renegotiate such contracts, then she might strictly prefer collusion to take place in equilibrium.
We develo p a m odel in which r e negotiation determines whether collusion will take place in equilibrium. I f the principal can commit not to renegotiate then there exists an optimal contract for which c o l lusion does not take p l ace i n e quilibrium. Given a certain parameter constellation the optimal contract is, however, not ex post ecient. If the principal and the agent are able to renegotiate, they will adopt a dierent contract later in the game. Since rational players will anticipate the change, they will m odify their behavior and the contract is n o l onger optimal. When we m odel the renegotiation explicitly, the p r i ncipal strictly prefers to oer contracts which i nduce collusion to take place in equilibrium. The paper therefore shows that the principal's behavior towards ex post ineciencies has a direct impact on whether collusion takes place in e q uilibrium.
The model we study is a procurement m odel with asymmetric information. The principal has a project of xed size, which a n a g e n t can realize. The agent and a supervisor know the exact cost of the project, while the principal does not. The principal wants to elicit the information from the supervisor, in order to determine the appropriate transfer to the agent for realizing the project. If the contract is increasing with the cost reported by the supervisor, then the agent has an incentive to bribe the supervisor to report higher costs. If such bribery is possible and the principal is a w are of this, then she i s interested in signals which tell s o m ething about the likeliness that collusion occurred. 1 Even w h e n these signals are imperfect, it is optimal for the principal to condition the contract on the signals, since this reduces the attractiveness of bribing. The imperfectness of the signal creates scope for renegotiation: Once the principal has ensured a truthful report, she prefers to change the contract. She does no longer w ant to condition the contract on the signal, since it may g i v e wrong indications. Preventing collusion and conditioning the contract on the external signal are incompatible and will lead to renegotiation. The principal has to choose between either allowing collusion to take place and to condition her contract on the external signal, or to prevent c ollusion and oer a contract which i s n o t c onditioned on the signal. W e s h o w that there exists a parameter constellation such that it i s optimal for the principal to choose the former policy.
Before introducing the model we will briey discuss related literature which addresses the occurrence of collusion in equilibrium. The literature on collusion in principalsupervisor-agent m odel was initiated by T i role (1986) . The paper studies an agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard, in which the supervisor may observe information about the agent's type. Tirole shows that there exists an optimal contract which does not induce collusion. Kofman and Lawarr ee (1994) study a three tier hierarchy m odel in which there are two supervisors, who can be employed simultaneously. The rst supervisor is costless to deploy, b u t s e nsitive to collusion. The second supervisor is uncorruptible, but expensive. K o f m an and Lawarr ee show that, depending on the cost of employing the second supervisor, collusion between the agent and the corruptible supervisor occurs with strictly positive probability i n equilibrium. S c heepens (1995) shows that collusion takes place in equilibrium when the principal can monitor collusion, but when monitoring is unveriable. The collusion problem is then transformed into a standard inspection game. When monitoring eort is contractible, there exists an optimal contract for which c o l lusion does not take p l ace in equilibrium. In Tirole (1992) it i s s h o w n that the principal may prefer to adopt contracts which i nduce c ollusion when there are dierent t ypes of supervisors with dierent l e v e ls of scruple. B y a l lowing collusion to take place by those types for which c ollusion is most costly to prevent the principal is able to screen b e t w een the dierent t ypes. Depending on the parameter constellation screening may be optimal.
The fact that optimal long-term contracts which are ecient e x a n te may turn out to be inecient ex post in an adverse selection context was rst recognized b y Dewatripont (1986) . H e pointed out that when contracting parties are aware of the ineciencies, then they may decide to renegotiate away the ineciency to the benet of all and adopt a new contract. Assuming that the principal will not renegotiate a contract when this i s benecial requires extreme commitment capabilities on part of the principal.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the general model. Section 3 derives the optimal contract of the game and points out the ex post ineciency of the contract. Sectio n 4 i n troduces and analyzes the game w i th renegotiation. Section 5 c oncludes.
2 The Model
The principal has a project which she values at R. A s i ngle agent can realize the project. Ex ante it is publicly known that the cost c of the project is c l with probability and c h with probability 1 0 , where R > c h > c l . In order to learn more about the costs the principal s e nds a supervisor to discuss the project with the agent. During the discussion the exact cost of the project is revealed to the agent and the supervisor. We have, therefore, t w o possible t ypes of agents and supervisors: a high cost and a low cost agent and supervisor. After the discussions the supervisor reports the cost of the project to the principal. The report, specifying whether the cost is high or low, does not need to be truthful. The agent can bribe the supervis o r i n o r d e r to induce him to collude and falsify the report r. Collusion may be accompanied b y a positive t ransfer from the agent to the supervisor, but not vice v ersa.
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The transfer is then p a r t o f a s i decontract between the supervisor and the agent, specifying a payment conditional on the supervisor's report. Transfers are costly and these costs are taken to be proportional to the s i ze of the transfer. The parameter k 2 [0; 1] expresses this cost. When the agent sends a transfer b, the supervisor receives only kb. 3 We do not analyze the bargaining procedure by w h i c h the bribe b is determined. We assume that bargaining between the supervisor and the agent l e a d s t o a n e c ient outcome. Whenever there exists a surplus from colluding, collusion will indeed take place. Neither do we address the issue of enforceability o f t he side-contract. We m e rely assume e nforceability and only h i n t that the diculties of enforcing the contract m a y explain why bribing is costly.
After obtaining the report, the principal receive s a s i gnal s 2 f b; ng, w h i c h i s i m perfectly correlated with collusion. When c ollusion has taken place the principal receives the signal s = b with probability p and the signal s = n with probability 1 0 p . W h e n collusion did not take p l ace the signal s = b is received w i th probability q, while the signal s = n is received with probability 1 0 q , where 0 < q < p < 1. Since q is smaller than p a signal s = b gives some indication that collusion has occurred. The signal s, therefore, contains information about the likeliness that collusion occurred. The parameters p and q are common knowledge.
We assume that the report r and the signal s are veriable. The principal can, therefore, c ondition her contract on these observable variables. Consequently we m a y d enote a contract to the agent a s a v e ctor w (w ln ; w lb ; w hn ; w hb ) and the contract t o t h e 2 The assumption that only the agent c a n send bribes is a simplifying assumption, which is not crucial for the analysis. 3 The dierent t r a nsfer opportunities of the players can also be interpreted as if there exist dierent transfer technologies for the players: k P = 1 , k A = k < 1 and k S = 0 conform Laont and Tirole (1991) .
supervisor as a vector t (t ln ; t l b ; t h n ; t h b ), where the two subscripts denote the report r and the signal s respectively. Concerning admissible contracts we assume that the supervisor's liability i s l imited to zero: In none of the events the principal can force the supervisor to make a positive transfer. For the agent w e assume a \no slavery condition": The agent cannot be contractually binded to execute the project. He c an at any point in time d e cide to take the outside option not to undertake the project. Consequently, the contract w only species payments to the agent conditional on the realisation of the project.
In the following let U P , U A and U S represent the payo functions of the principal, agent and supervisor. We assume that all p l a y ers are risk neutral and all outside options are normalized to zero.
Timing in the game is as follows: t=1: Nature chooses the cost of the project and reveals this to the agent and supervisor. t=2: The principal oers a contract w 2 I R 4 + to the agent and a contract t 2 I R 4 + to the supervisor. These contracts are public information. t=3: The supervisor decides whether to accept the contract. t=4: The supervisor and agent decide whether to collude. t=5: The supervisor reveals his report r. t=6: The signal s is revealed. t=7: The agent d e cides whether to execute the project. t=8: Payos are realized.
Note that stage 3 of the game i s r edundant. The supervisor does not incur any costs. Any contract t 2 I R 4 + is therefore individual rational and will b e a c c epted by the supervisor.
In stage 7 the agent has to decide whether to execute the project. He will do so if the wage he gets for realizing the project outweighs the costs. At stage 7 the wage and the cost are perfectly known to him. Consequently, his decision is straightforward. The project is realized when the relevant w age w is larger than or equal to the cost c. W e introduce the following two i ndicator functions, which w e will later use for expressing the agent's decision. Before d e riving the optimal contract for the game, w e w i ll briey comment o n s i m plied versions of the model. This may h e lp to develop some i n tuition for the more complicated game. When the principal does not make use of a supervisor, she receives neither a report r nor the signal s. The optimal contract i s g i v e n b y a degenerated direct mechanism. The mechanism is degenerated in the sen s e t h a t i t p r e scribes identical schedules t o b o t h t y pes o f a g e n ts. 4 In the case that R 0 c h > ( R 0 c l ) i t is optimal for the principal to o e r a w age w = c h independent of the agent's announcement of his type. Under the parameter constellation R 0 c h < ( R 0 c l ) the optimal contract s p e c ies a at wage w = c l .
The game is trivial when the players cannot forge the report. In this case the supervisor must truthfully reveal the cost of the project to the principal. The contract t 3 (0;0;0;0), w 3 lb w 3 ln c l and w 3 hb w 3 hn c h gives the principal the payo U P (w 3 ;t 3 ) = (R 0c l )+(1 0 )(R 0 c h ). The contract ( w 3 ; t 3 ) a c hieves the rst best.
When the agent and supervisor are able to collude and forge the report, the contract (w 3 ; t 3 ) does no longer attain the rst best. The low cost agent and the supervisor will collude in order to divide the surplus 1c c h 0 c l . This implies that under the contract (w 3 ; t 3 ) the principal receives a report r = h whatever the co s t o f t he project and has an expected payo of R 0 c h .
When collusion is possible, the principal has two options. She can design the contract (w;t) i n such a w a y that there is no surplus from colluding. We w i ll dene such a contract as collusion-proof. The supervisor's report is truthful and the principal can make e ective use of the report. A second option is to allow collusion to take p l ace. In this case collusion will occur and the supervisor's report will not be truthful. 5 In the following we rst show t hat we m a y assume w i thout loss of generality that there exists an optimal contract which i s collusion-proof and compute the optimal contract. Note that in this section we i m plicitely assume that the principal can fully commit to her contracts and renegotiation does not take place.
Collusion-proofness 4 As Tirole (1992) notes the problem is identical to the classical pricing decision of a monopolist who faces two t ypes of consumers with a dierent w i llingness to pay between which she cannot pricediscriminate.
5 A further option would be to allow collusion to take place with a certain probability. W e here concentrate on pure actions only. L a ter we will come b a ck to the issue of probabilistic collusion.
In order to ensure that collusion does not take place, the principal has to d e sign the contract (w;t) in such a w a y that there does not exist a surplus between the agent and the supervisor from colluding. In principle the principal has to prevent t w o forms o f collusion. First, collusion may o c cur between the low cost agent and the supervisor and, second, the high cost agent and the supervisor may collude. S i nce in the present model optimal contracts will b e w eakly m onotonic increasing with the reported cost, the relevant threat of collusion comes from the low cost agent. A low cost agent w i ll want t o pass for a high cost agent i n order to get a higher wage. We w i ll therefore concentrate on collusion by the low cost agent and ex post check w h e ther the obtained optimal contract does not induce collusion between the high cost agent and supervisor.
Whether collusion occurs depends on the eect which the report has on the payos of the agent and supervisor. Let the project be of the low cost c = c l . Then, if the supervisor reports the cost truthfully, this results i n a n e x pected payo to the agent and the supervisor of By assumption collusion cannot be accompanied by a n e gative transfer from the agent to the supervisor. A necessary condition for collusion to take p l ace i s therefore U F A (w) > U T A ( w ). In this case the agent i s w i lling to send a non-negative bribe b of at most b max U F A (w) 0 U T A (w). In order for the supervisor to collude he has to receive a bribe of at least b min U T S (t) 0 U F S (t). It follows that collusion will not occur if kb max b min :
(1) In this case the maximum transfer the agent is willing to give for collusion is not enough to induce the supervisor to cooperate. W e can rewrite condition (1) Proposition 1 Any payo associated w i t h a c ontract (w;t) can also be attained b y a c o n t r a ct which is collusion-proof.
Proof: Consider a contract (w;t) which i s not collusion-proof, then collusion occurs either when the project is low cost or when the project i s high cost. If c o l lusion takes place when the project is l o w cost then the principal always receives a report r = h. I t f ollows that the principal will never receive a r e port r = l and the wages w ln ; t ln and w lb ; t lb are irrelevant. N o w c onsider the contract ( w 0 ; t 0 ), where w 0 = ( w hn ; w hb ; w hn ; w hb ) and t 0 = (t hn ; t hb ;t hn ;t hb ). Thecontract ( w 0 ; t 0 ) s a t i s es the collusion-proofness constraint (2) and is collusion-proof. The associated payo to the principal of the contract (w 0 ; t 0 ) is the same as for the contract (w;t). A similar argument h o l ds for the case in which the contract ( w;t) i s not collusion-proof with respect to the high cost project.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 implies that we m a y without loss of generality assume that there exists an optimal contract which is collusion-proof. Thus, an optimal contract is a contract (ŵ;t) which m aximizes U P (w;t) = ((1 0 q)((R 0 w ln )I l (w ln ) 0 t ln ) + q ( ( R 0 w lb )I l (w lb ) 0 t lb )) +(1 0 )((1 0 q)((R 0 w hn )I h (w hn ) 0 t hn ) + q((R 0w hb )I h (w hb ) 0t hb )): (3) subject t o t he collusion-proofness constraint (2). Two observations regarding the optimal contract follow i m m e diately. F i rst, the optimal contract satisest hn =t hb = 0, s i nce the principal's payo is decreasing in t hn and t hb and the collusion-proofness constraint i s given more slack when t hn or t hb decreases. It i m plies that in the optimum the supervisor is not paid for a report r = h. Second, the collusion-proofness constraint is binding at the optimum. I f the collusion-proofness constraint d o e s n o t b i nd then the principal is better o oering the supervis o r a c ontract wit h a l ower t ln or t lb , since @U P (w;t)=@t ln = @U P (w;t)=@t lb = 0 < 0. 6 We can therefore treat the weak inequality i n (2) as strict equality. Substituting (2) into the objective function (3) and rewriting the expression, leads to 6 Due to the monotonicity of the optimal contract we h a v e U F A ( w ) 0 U T A ( w ) 0. This ensures that t ln or t lb has to be positive. Consequently the constraint t ln ; t lb 0 is not violated when the collusion-proofness constraint i s satised in equality. max w U P (w) = (1 0 )(1 0 q)(R 0 w hn )I h (w hn )0k(10p)(w hn 0 c l )I l (w hn ) (4) +(1 0 )q(R 0 w hb )I h (w hb ) 0 kp(w hb 0c l )I l (w hb ) +(10q)(R 0 (1 0 k)w ln 0 kc l )I l (w ln ) +q(R0(1 0 k)w lb 0 kc l )I l (w lb ): In the following the equilibrium will depend on the parameter c onstellation. To simplify notation we i n troduce the following function
Proposition 2 The optimal contract ( w;t) depends on the parameter constellation in the following way i) If S(1 0 q;(1 0 p)k) > 0 then ( w ln ;ŵ lb ;ŵ hn ;ŵ hb ) = (c l ; c l ; c l ; c l ) andt = (0;0;0;0). The principal's maximum payo is U P ( w;t) = ( R 0 c l ) .
ii) If S(1 0 q;(1 0 p)k) 0 and S(q;pk) < 0 then ( w ln ;ŵ lb ;ŵ hn ;ŵ hb ) = ( c l ; c l ; c h ; c h ) and (t ln ;t lb ;t hn ;t hb ) = ( k 1 c; k1c; 0;0).
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The principal's maximum payo i s U P ( w;t) = ( R 0 c l ) + ( 1 0 )(R 0 c h ) 0 k1c.
iii) If S(1 0 q;(1 0 p)k) 0 and S(q;pk) 0 then ( w l n ; w l b ; w h n ; w h b ) = ( c l ; c l ; c h ; c l ) a n d ( t l n ; t l b ; t h n ; t h b ) = ( kp1c; kp1c; 0;0). The principal's maximum payo is U P (ŵ;t) = (R 0 c l ) + (1 0 )(1 0 q)(R 0 c h ) 0 k(1 0 p)1c. Proof: Note that the objective function in (4) is piece-wise linear in all w i and has non-positive slopes. The function shows an upward jump a t c l for all w i (i = 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4) and a second upward jump a t c h for w hn and w hb . F rom these observations we conclude that the optimal contract is found for w ln = w lb = c l and w hn ; w hb 2 f c l ; c h g . W e have four cases to consider: Case 1: w = w First note that the contract w 4 cannot be optimal. F or w 4 to achieve the maximum payo it is required that U P (w 4 ) > U P ( w 1 ) a n d U P ( w Comparing the dierent p a y os to the principal we arrive at the following conditions i) U P (w 1 ) > U P (w 2 ) , k1c > (1 0 )(R 0 c h ), ii) U P (w 3 ) > U P (w 2 ) , pk1c > q ( 1 0 )(R 0 c h ), and iii) U P (w 1 ) > U P (w 3 ) , (1 0 p)k1c > (1 0 q)(1 0 )(R 0 c h ). It follows that if U P (w 2 ) > U P (w 1 ) then U P (w 3 ) > U P (w 1 ) and the proposition is immediate. F i nally note that collusion by the high cost agent and the supervisor will indeed not occur under the contracts which the proposition species.
The statement of proposition 2 is illustrated in gure 1. The diagram depicts the regions in which the dierent contracts are optimal. We w i ll shortly discuss each o f the regions. In r e gion I the principal oers the agent a p a yment c l independent of the supervisor's report r and the signal s. The principal, therefore, does not strictly benet from employing the supervisor and receiving the signal s. Due to the monotonicity o f the contract, the agent c annot gain from collusion and will not bribe the supervisor for misreporting. The principal, therefore, does not need to give additional incentives to the supervisor for reporting truthfully. N ote that the project will only be executed in the case of low cost. Therefore, for the contract to be optimal the expected cost of foregoing the project needs to be small. T h i s is the case when the probability that the project is low cost is high ( close to one), and when the surplus from executing the high cost project i s l o w ( R 0 c h small).
In region II it is optimal for the principal to condition the agent's p a yment o n t h e supervisor's report. This way the principal tries to discriminate between low and high cost projects. Since the agent's payment depends on the supervisor's report, there exists scope for collusion: The low cost agent w ould like to pass for a high cost agent. In order to prevent c ollusion the principal oers an incentive c ompatible contract to the supervisor to induce truthful reporting. The expected c ost of this contract is k1c. The contract will be optimal when collusion is not too costly to prevent. This implies that k should be small. Since the principal conditions her contract only on the report r, w e will refer to this contract as the partial-screening contract. In regionIIIit i s optimal to condition the agent's p a yment not only on the supervisor's report but also on the signal s. B y u s i ng this full-screening contract collusion becomes less attractive for the agent a s c o m pared to the partial-screening contract, which i s optimal in region II. The expected costs of preventing collusion is t h us reduced by a factor p to pk1c. The principal will prefer full-screening to partial-screening if collusion is relatively costly to prevent (i.e. a large k). The drawback of the contract i s, however, that the agent does not execute the project when the cost is c h and the signal is s = b. T h e refore, for the contra c t t o b e o p t i m al it m ust be that this event o c c urs with a reasonably small p r obability and when it occurs the principal should not care too much. This implies that the probability that a project i s of high cost must be small (i.e. large) and that the signal s is suciently informative (i.e. the ratio q=p is s m all), while the principal's willingness to execute a high cost project ( R 0 c h ) m ust be not too high. These conditions are reected by the constraint S(q;pk) 0, which i s the lower curve in the gure. On the other hand the principal's willingness to pay R should be large enough for the principal not to forgo the project e n tirely whenever its cost is c h . This is ensured by the condition S(1 0 q;(1 0 p)k) 0, represented in the gure by the upper curve.
An interesting observation is that the principal prevents collusion by setting the appropriate incentives to the supervisor rather than to the agent. The intuition behind this result is that it is c heaper t o i nduce truthtelling by giving the incentives to the supervisor than to give these incentives to the agent. Referring to the collusion-proofness constraint (1), the principal can either prevent collusion by increasing the minimal bribe which i s accepted by the supervisor (b min ), or by decreasing the maximal bribe which the agent is willing to give for inducing collusion (b max ). Due to the costly bribing technology the eect of reducing b max by one unit i s e qual to increasing b min with k units. Increasing b min is, therefore, a factor k cheaper than reducing b max .
Now assume that the parameter c onstellation is such t h a t i t i s optimal for the principal to use full screening. In this case the principal does not make full use of the supervisor's information. When the principal receives a report r = h and a signal s = b, she diverges from the supervisor's information and sets a transfer c l to the agent. When the actual cost of the project is c h then this gives rise to an ineciency. The agent i s promised a transfer c l for realizing the project, but declines the oer, since h i s c ost is larger than c l . The agent does therefore not realize the project, even though the principal's willingness to pay R is greater than the cost of the project c h . The optimal contract l eaves scope for i neciencies, which o c cur with a probability ( 1 0 ) q .
Renegotiation
The ex-post ineciency prompts us to look at renegotiation and commitment. The important o b s e rvation is that when the principal uses full-screening and receives a report r = h and a signal s = b she knows that the actual cost of the project is c h . To s e e this let the principal receive a report r = h and a signal s = b. She then knows that the cost of the project must either be c h or c l . But since the contract i s c o l lusion-proof she knows that the report is truthful and she, therefore, m ust conclude that the cost of the project is indeed c h . As a consequence she realizes that the agent w i ll refuse to execute the project if she sticks to the transfer which is specied by the contract:ŵ hb = c l . After stage 6 she has an incentive t o r e negotiate the contract and raise w hb to c h . T h i s c hange is also weakly preferred by the agent and is therefore a Pareto improvement.
We incorporate renegotiation by i n troducing an intermediate stage 6 1 = 2 , where we allow the principal to propose a new contract w and in which the agent m a y decide to accept the new contract or to stick to the old contract. In stage 7 the agent decides whether to execute the project given the contract which i s r e l evant at that stage.
At the renegotiation stage the principal forms a b e l ief about the cost of the project. Let (w;t; r ; s ) r epresent t he principal's belief that the cost of the project is c l given the contract (w;t), the report r and the signal s. Then we can dene renegotiation-proofness in the following way.
Denition 2 A c ontract (w;t) is renegotiation-proof if it satises for allr2 f h; lg and s 2 f b; ng (a) (R 0 c l )(w;t;r; s )>0)w r s c l (b) (R 0 c l )(w;t; r ; s )< R 0 c h ) w rs c h :
Condition a) states that when the principal attaches positive probability to the event that the project is of low cost then she should oer at least a payment c l for executing the project. The second condition states that when the principal believes she receives a higher expected payo from oering a wage c h instead of oering less than c h , then she should at least oer a payment c h . I t i s o b v ious that when these conditions are not satised by a contract (w;t) then there exists a contingency in which the contract i s r enegotiated. When the two conditions are satised n o s u c h contingency exists.
Proposition 3 Any payo associated w i th a contract which is not renegotiation-proof can also be achieved b y a c ontract which is renegotiation-proof.
Proof: Consider a contract (w;t) which i s not renegotiation-proof. Then it i s common knowledge that this contract will be renegotiated into a contract (w 0 ; t ) a t a l ater stage. Rationality will ensure that all players act as if the relevant contract is the contract (w 0 ; t ). Consequently the payos under the contract (w;t) and the contract (w 0 ; t ) are identical.
It follows directly that we m a y assume without loss of generality that the optimal contract is renegotiation-proof.
In equilibrium the principal's beliefs should be consistent with the behavior of the agent and supervisor. Since the supervisor and agent d o n o t c ollude given the contract ( w;t), consistency of beliefs requires that ( w;t; r ; s ) = 0 f o r r = h and s = n; b. A s a c o n sequence the full-screening contract is not renegotiation-proof, sinceŵ hb = c l < c h . It follows that any contract (w;t) which i s collusion-proof must specify w hn c h and w hb c h in order to be renegotiation-proof. This implies that independent of the parameter constellation the optimal collusion-proof contract which is also renegotiationproof is the partial-screening contract w lb = w ln = c l and w hb = w hn = c h .
Another implication of proposition 3 is that proposition 1 no longer needs to hold i n the extended game w i th renegotiation. In order to prove propositio n 1 w e used the fact that for every non-collusion-proof contract one can nd a collusion-proof contract which achieves the same p a y o. It is, however, not ensured that one can nd for every noncollusion-proof contract which is renegotiation-proof a collusion-proof contract which is also renegotiation-proof. We therefore can no longer assume that there exists an optimal contract which is collusion-proof and must also consider contracts which are not collusion-proof.
Proposition 4 The optimal contract in the game with renegotiation depends on the parameter constellation in the following way: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The principal's maximum payo is U P = p(R 0c l )+[(10p)+(10)(10q)](R0c h ). Proof: Theproposition follows from a staightforwardcomparisonbetween the maximum payo which can be achieved in the set of renegotiation-proof contracts which are not collusion-proof (calculated in the appendix) and the maximum payo which c an be achieved in the set of renegotiation-and collusion-proof contracts. Q.E.D. Figure 2 depicts the regions for which the dierent contracts are optimal. In region I it is o ptimal for the principal to oer a a t w age independent of the report r and the signal s. The payo associated with this contract is e qual to the maximum payo of the principal in the game w i thout renegotiation. In fact under this parameter constellation the principal is not interested i n e m ploying a supervisor or receiving the signal s.
In region II the principal oers a collusion-proof contract in equilibrium. The region can be divided into two subregions. The area IIa depicts the region in which the optimal contract is identical to the optimal contract which w e obtained in the game without renegotiation. Consequently, also the payos are the same in both games. In the region IIb the optimal contract in the game w i th renegotiation diers from the optimal contract in the game without renegotiation. When the principal can commit not to renegotiate she oers a contract w h i c h also conditions the agent's c ontract on the signal s. The contract is, however, not ex-post ecient and therefore not renegotiation-proof. As a consequence, it will be renegotiated in the game with renegotiation and is n o l onger optimal. Instead it is optimal for the principal to oer a dierent collusion-proof contract. It follows that the m aximum payo of the principal is lower in the game with renegotiation than in the game w i thout renegotiation.
The most i n teresting area is r e gion III. For this region the optimal contract also diers from the optimal contract in the game without renegotiation. This implies that the principal's m aximum payo has also decreased. In the literature on renegotiation this i s a g e neral result. The reason being that in a game w i th renegotiation the principal has a smaller set of contracts to which she can commit. The interesting point here is, however, that the optimal contract c hanges from a collusion-proof contract to a contract which i s n o t c o l l u s i o n -proof. The reason is that when the principal does oer the collusion-proof contract, which i s o p t i m al in the game w i thout renegotiation, she may obtain information which w i ll lead her to renegotiate the contract. This fact i s c ommon knowledge and induces the supervisor and the agent t o c hange their behavior ex ante. The principal is better o ensuring that she does not obtain the information, in order not to change the behavior of the supervisor and the agent. Not obtaining the information means that she does not oer a collusion-proof contract.
Strong v e r sus weak renegotiation-proofness Note that in the above discussion we u s e d the concept of strong renegotiation-proof contracts.
8 If we require contracts to be only weakly renegotiation-proof then a l so other equilibria in the renegotiation game e xist. To see this, note that given the full-screening contract the supervisor and the agent are in fact indierent b e t w e en colluding and noncolluding. While w e assumed that collusion would not take place given the contract (w;t), an alternative best response for the agent and the supervisor would h a v e b e en to collude. In that case the contract (w;t) is renegotiation-proof.
Let the supervisor and the agent c ollude with probability given the contract (w;t). In case the principal receive s a r e port r = h and a signal s = b she updates her belief 8 A contract is strong renegotiation-proof if there does not exist any equilibrium in the renegotiation game f or which the contract is n o t renegotiation-proof. A weakly renegotiation-proof contract requires that there exist an equilibrium for which the contract is renegotiation-proof. See Maskin and Tirole (1992) according to Bayes' rule (w; t; h; b) 
Proposition 5 Let the p arameter constellation be s u c h t h at S(1 0 q;(1 0 p)k) 0 and S(q;pk) 0 then the full screening contract (w;t) with > is an equilibrium outcome in the game with renegotiation.
Proof: We know that the full screening contract (w;t) is renegotiation-proof if > . I n o r d e r f or the outcome ( w; t; ) with > to be subgame perfect w e need that U P (w;t;) is larger than the maximum payo of the non-collusion-proof contract (w ncp ;t ncp ) for all > . Since U P (w;t; ) i s decreasing in and U P (w ncp ; t ncp ) = U P ( w;t;1) we h a v e that U P (w ncp ; t ncp ) < U P ( w; t; ) for all < 1.
The fact that collusion has to occur with at least a probability is again explained by r e ferring to the informative c ontent of the contract (w;t). In order for the principal not to renegotiate, she may not attach too high a probability t o the state of the world being c = c h when she receives the report r = h and the signal s = b. W h e n she oers the contract ( w;t) and the supervisor and agent collude with probability her updated belief (6) makes her indierent b e t w een proposing the partial-screening contract in the renegotiation-stage and not renegotiating. When the agent and the supervisor collude with a higher probability than , the principal's belief about the cost of the project is such that it is strictly better for her not to renegotiate.
Finally note that any e q uilibrium outcome with < 1 g i v es the principal a strictly higher payo than her p a y o associated with the optimal contract in proposition 2.
5 Conclusion This paper showed that when the principal renegotiates ex post inecient contracts then under certain parameter conditions the optimal contract is n e cessarily not collusionproof. When the principal can commit not renegotiate ex post inecient contracts, then there exists an optimal contract which i s c ollusion-proof regardless of the parameter constellation. The optimal contract may, h o w ever, produce e x p o s t i n e ciencies.
In order to explain the result w e r e fer to two p r inciples. First there exists the principle of renegotiation. This principle says that for every non-renegotiation-proof contract there exists a contract which i s r e negotiation-proof with identical payos. Second, there exists the principle of collusion-proofness. This principle s a ys that for every non-collusion-proof contract there exists a contract which is collusion-proof with identical payos. We h a v e shown that in the game without renegotiation the principle of collusion-proofness holds. As a direct consequence there exists an optimal contract which i s c o l lusion-proof. We have further shown that when the principal cannot commit not to renegotiate, then the principle of renegotiation takes precedence over the principle o f c ollusion-proofness and the latter principle may fail to hold. The cr u x o f t h e m atter is that when one tries t o nd the collusion-proof counterpart of a non-collusion-proof contract, then the collusion-proof contract may not be renegotiation-proof even though the non-collusion-proof contract i s r e n e g o t i a t i o n -proof. T h i s e xplains why there may not exist an optimal contract which is collusion-proof.
We m a y give a n a l ternative e xplanation for our result. It was shown that when a collusion-proof contract is oered the principal recognizes the ineciency and wants to renegotiate. In contrast the principal is not certain enough about the ineciency t o renegotiate when she oers a contract w h i c h d o e s i nduce collusion. Since the principal's attitude toward renegotiation is common knowledge, it a e c ts the behavior of players ex ante. This w orsens the principal's situation by such a degree that she is b e tter o allowing collusion to take p l ace instead of preventing it. It is the fact that a contract is collusion-proof which informs the principal about the actual state of the world and makes her fully a w are of the ineciency. The information embodied i n the collusionproof contract is h a r m ful to the principal. Interpreting the result i n t h i s w a y i t b e c omes clear that the result i s c l osely l i nked to a general theme i n g a m e -theory that information may w orsen a player's situation, when it i s c o m m on knowledge that this p l a y e r h a s information. Extra information changes the behavior of a player and this c hange is anticipated by other p l a y e rs in the game. In the present paper obtaining information is equivalent t o o e ring a collusion-proof contract. Since the principal is a w are that the extra information worsens her situation, she will not oer a collusion-proof contract. Instead she allows collusion to take place.
Appendix: The optimal non-collusion-proof contract In this appendix we compute the optimal contract which i s n o t c o l lusion-proof. Note that this case does not reduce to the situation without a supervisor, since by e m ploying the supervisor the principal still receives the signal s. First we c alculate the optimal contract in the game w i thout renegotiation. Then we show t h a t t h i s contract is also renegotiation-proof in the game with renegotiation.
If the agent and the supervisor collude then the report does not contain any i nformation, because whatever the cost of the project the same report is s e n t. Consequently, the report is uninformative to the principal and she will oer the least costly c ontract which the supervisor accepts, i.e. t = ( 0 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0). Without loss of generality w e assume that it is the low cost agent and the supervisor who collude. This implies that the principal always receives a report r = h. The principal's payo is U P (w) = p(R0w hn )I l (w hn ) + (1 0 p)(R 0 w hb )I l (w hb ) +(1 0 )q(R 0 w hn )I h (w hn ) + ( 1 0 )(1 0 q)(R 0 w hb )I h (w hb ) (8) The principal's payo does not depend on w ln and w lb . W h e n the low cost agent a l w a ys colludes, the principal will never receive a report r = l and the wages w ln and w lb can be set arbitrarily. F or reasons which w i ll become clear later we set w ln = w lb = c l . Note, however, t hat the wages w ln , w lb do aect the decision regarding collusion.
The function U P (w) is a discontinuous, piece-wise linear function. Again we h a v e four cases to consider. Case a: w hn = w hb = c l . The principal does not try to screen between the high cost and the low c ost project. Instead she oers a transfer c l irrespective of the report and the signal. The project is executed if i t i s l o w c ost. The payo to the principal is Case d: w hn = c h and w hb = c l . I n this case the principal also uses the signal s as a screening device. The expected p a y o is U d P p(R0c h )+(10p)(R0c l )+(10 )q(R 0c h ). The project is not executed when it is of high cost and the principal observes the signal s = n. T h i s occurs with probability ( 1 0 )(1 0 q). Proposition 6 In the game without renegotiation the c ontract (w ncp ; t n c p )is optimal with respect to the set of contracts which are not collusion-proof, where (w ncp ; t ncp ) is Q.E.D.
Proposition 7 The optimal contracts in proposition 6 are r enegotiation-proof.
Proof: It trivially holds that the contract specifying w hn = w hb = c h is renegotiationproof. For the contract w ln = w lb = w hb = c l and w hn = c h it follows by B a y e s' rule that 
Note that the contract w c is optimal when p1c q(1 0 )(R 0 c h ). This condition together with equation (9) leads to the conclusion that when the contract w c is optimal in the set of non-collusion-proof contracts then it i s a l so renegotiation-proof. By the same argument one may ascertain that when the contract w hn = w hb = c l is the optimal non-collusion-proof contract then it is also renegotiation-proof. Q.E.D.
